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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

James A. Johnson and
Jennifer L. Johnson,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.

Case No. 930340
900400460CN

Nielsen & Senior, a Utah
Corporation, and Pat B. Brian,
Defendants-Respondents.

I. JURISDICTION
This is an appeal
Court, Utah County,

from a dismissal

State of Utah

Supreme Court has jurisdiction
Section

78-2-2. The

by the Fourth District

of Appellant's

action.

pursuant to Utah Code

Supreme Court

have

poured

this

The

Annotated
case

over

pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(k).
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether

the court

abused

it

discretion when

it

dismissed this action for failure to prosecute.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:
It is not to be doubted that in order to handle the
business of the court with efficiency and expedition, the
trial court should have a reasonable latitude of
discretion in dismissing for failure to prosecute if a
party fails to move forward according to the rules and
the direction of the court, without justifiable excuse.
Westinghouse Electric Supply Company v. Paul W. Larsen
Construction, Inc., 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975).
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2.

Whether

the

trial

court

improperly

dismissed

plaintiffs' claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress
and negligent infliction of emotional distress as a measure of
damages with regard to causes of action for legal malpractice by
defendants.
STANDARD FOR REVIEW:
A trial court's statements or conclusions of law
are accorded no particular deference; we review
them for correctness. Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P. 2d
1176,1179 (Utah 1989).
3.

Whether the trial court was without jurisdiction to

dismiss while a request for Interlocutory Order was before the Utah
Supreme Court.
STANDARD FOR REVIEW:
A trial court's statements or conclusions of law
are accorded no particular deference; we review
them for correctness. Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P. 2d
1176,1179 (Utah 1989).
If there is any genuine issue as to any material fact,
the motion should be denied. Young v. Filerenia, 121 Utah
646 244 P.2d 862 Cert, denied 344 U.S. 886 73 S.Ct. 186
97 L.Ed 685 (1952).
III. DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
1.

Utah Constitution Article I Section 11:
All courts shall be open,and every person, for an injury
done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall
ahve remedy by due course of law, which shall be
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending
before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel,
any civil cause to which he is a party.
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Utah Constitution Article VIII Section 2:
The Supreme Court shall be the highest court and shall
consist of at least five justices. The number of justices
may be changed by statute, but no change shall have the
effect of removing a justice from office. A chief justice
shall be selected from among the justices of the Supreme
Court as provided by statute. The chief justice may
resign as chief justice without resigning from the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court by rule may sit and
render final judgment either en banc or in divisions. The
court shall not declare nay law unconstitutional under
this constitution or the Constitution of the United
States, except on the occurrence of a majority of all
justices of the Supreme Court. If a justice of the
Supreme Court is disqualified or otherwise unable to
participate in a cause before the court, the chief
justice, or in the event the chid justice is disqualified
or unable to participate, the remaining justices, shall
call an active judge from an appellate court or the
district court to participate in the case.
Utah Constitution Article VIII Section 3:
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to
issue all extraordinary writs and to answer questions of
state law certified by a court of the United States. The
Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over all
other matters to be exercised as provided by statute, and
power to issue all writs and orders necessary for the
exercise of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction or the
complete determination any cause.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 41(b):
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply
with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may
move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against
him.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c):
Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be
served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the
hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing
may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall
be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
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answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any of material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment,
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the
issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF CASE

This case is an appeal from a dismissal with prejudice for
failure to prosecute by the trial court and a summary

judgment

dismissing claims for emotional distress damages.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

1.

DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE. On October 5, 1992,

former counsel for plaintiffs moved to withdraw since no trial date
had been set in the matter. R at 1737. On October 26, 1992, R at
1756, and again on December 23, 1992, R at 1782(a), present counsel
appeared

due to

confusion

as to

whether withdrawal

of

former

counsel had been accepted by the court.
The court accepted the Motion to Withdraw of former counsel by
Order filed January 15, 1993, (R at 1785).
Defendants

immediately

moved

to

dismiss

the

plaintiffs'

Complaint for failure to prosecute on February 3, 1993, (R at 1802
and 1804).
Plaintiff opposed this motion by Memorandum filed February 19,
1993, (R at 1812). Defendants replied by Memorandum file March 1,
1993,

(R at 1858). Judgment for Dismissal was granted March 11,

1993 and entered April 6, 1993, (R at 1879). Motion for New Trial
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was filed April 16, 1993, (R at 1895). Memorandum in Opposition to
Motion for New Trial was opposed by defendants by Memorandum filed
May 3, 1993 (R at 1928). Reply Memorandum was filed by plaintiffs
May 13, 1993, (R at 2101). The court issued a Memorandum Decision
filed May 26, 1993 denying Motion for New Trial, (R at 2119). An
Order Denying Motion for New Trial was filed June 16, 1993 by the
Court, (R at 2167). Notice of Appeal was filed in this matter by
plaintiffs on June 25, 1993, R at (2177).

2.
DAMAGES.

PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

REGARDING EMOTIONAL

DISTRESS

Defendants sought to dismiss all claims with regard to

infliction of emotional distress and all damages of a like nature
arising under other claims of plaintiffs. A Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on the matter was filed November 8, 1991, R at
1060.

The Motion

for Partial

plaintiffs by Memorandum

Summary

Judgment

filed December

was

opposed

2, 1991, (R at

Defendant Pat B. Brian joined in the Motion for Partial

by

1110).
Summary

Judgment by Motion filed December 9, 1991, (R at 1124), and Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment filed December 9, 1992, (R at 1130).
A Reply Memorandum was filed by defendant Nielsen & Senior December
11,

1991,

(R

at

1147).

Defendant

Nielsen

& Senior

supported

Defendant Pat B. Brian's Motion by Memorandum filed December 30,
1991, (R at 1165).
Plaintiffs opposed, by memorandum, Defendant Pat B. Brian's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on January 6, 1992, (R at
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1242). Partial Summary Judgment was granted by Order filed January
23, 1992, (R at 1371) .
C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR
REVIEW

This matter arose out of professional malpractice committed by
defendant

Pat B.

Brian.

In January

of 1986, Plaintiffs

hired

Defendant Pat B. Brian to take care of all legal requirements with
regard to a private placement adoption, (R at 1876). The baby was
born on or about June 25, 1986 in Texas, (R at 10).
On or about June 27, 1986, Defendant Brian brought the baby
from Texas to Salt Lake International Airport, but failed in any
way to comply with the provisions of the Interstate Compact for the
Placement of Children in any way shape or form, (R at 1875).
No consent to adopt or termination or parental
executed

by

the

birth

mother

at

any

time

when

rights was

dealing

with

Defendants Brian and Nielsen & Senior.
On or about June 24, 1987, Chris Schmutz, successor counsel to
Defendant Brian, informed plaintiffs

that the birth mother was

seeking to regain custody of the child, (R at 10). Following the
retaining of different law firm on July 2, 1987, a termination of
parental

rights

was agreed

to

with

the

birth mother

and

the

adoption finalized on October 16, 1987, (R at 1875).
Between October 16, 1987 and the date of the filing of the
petition in June of 1990, plaintiffs

attempted to negotiate a

settlement with defendants, (R at 1874).
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Because defendant Brian was a sitting

judge, (R at 1875),

plaintiffs have had difficulty in retaining counsel, and filed the
original complaint pro se, (R at 12).
Plaintiff James A. Johnson originally had depositions set for
November

6,

1990, but

such

deposition

was

rescheduled

until

November 28, 1990, (R at 192 and 232). Plaintiff was subjected to
such intense stress from the deposition over a three (3) day period
of time that the stress he relapsed into the depression he is
suffering from as a result of the original adoption. This caused
him to be unable to continue the deposition, (R at 412) (letter
from treating physician, Ralph W. Gant).
Mr. Johnson's depression was a direct result of Post-traumatic
Stress Disorde* which he suffered as a result of the malpractice of
defendants, (R at 1177).
Defendant Brian originally had a deposition set for October
27, 1990, (R at 1901). Defendant Brian changed and rescheduled his
deposition for November

30, 1990, (R at 229). Defendant

Brian

finally had his deposition actually taken, November 30, 1993, (R at
1225),

more

than

one

year

from

the

original

date

scheduled.

Defendant Brian's extension and rescheduling was not due to the
unavailability of the plaintiffs nor their counsel.
The continuance

of Mr. Johnson's deposition

following

the

appearance of Darwin Fisher in this matter on April 16, 1991, (R at
867), was entirely due to the procrastination of defendants, (R at
1901).
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The continuance and delay with regard to Defendant Brian's
deposition was due to his request for delay, R at 1901.
It was not

until

October

17, 1991, that Defendant

Brian

proposed a Counterclaim in this matter, sixteen (16) months after
initiation of the action and after trial had been set for February
17-28, 1992, (R at 897).
On January 17, 1992, one (1) month prior to trial, the trial
court granted leave to Defendant Brian's to file his Counterclaim
(R at 1729). Counterclaim was filed by Defendant Brian on February
4, 1992, (R at 1484). Because of Defendant Brian's tardy filing of
a Counterclaim, new trial was set by the court for May of 1992, (R
at 1490).
At the same time that the Counterclaim for Defendant Brian was
allowed, partial

summary

judgment

was granted

with

regard

to

emotional distress damages of plaintiffs by the court, denying the
same, (R at 1371). This order was filed January 23, 1992.
Based upon the denial of a major portion of plaintiffs' claim
for damages, those

due to the emotional

distress suffered by

plaintiffs, (R at 1177), plaintiffs requested

an

interlocutory

opinion by the Utah Supreme Court on April 7, 1992, (R at 1645).
The trial court continued the trial without date by Order entered
April 7, 1992, (R at 1647). No trial date was set thereafter by the
court, (R at 1737), although the impression of the parties was that
the court was to set a date in November, (R at 1745 and 1899).
No response to the Motion for Interlocutory Order was ever
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entered by the Utah Supreme Court

in this matter prior to the

dismissal of this case with prejudice.
Defendants, as well as plaintiffs, have both been compelled by
the court to respond to discovery, (R at 859 and 863). In addition,
defendants expert witnesses have been unavailable prior to the end
of scheduled

discovery,

(R at 1547, 1657 and

1666).

For

this

reason, the court granted an Order Extending Discovery (R at 1584
and 1687) .
In addition, defendant Nielsen

& Senior

sought

protective

orders which the court denied, (R at 1700).
Finally, Defendant

Brian was

extremely

uncooperative

with

regard to response to Request for Production of Documents, his
refusal being found to without substance (R at 530 and 555). It was
this meretricious conduct that caused the court to compel Defendant
Brian to respond to discovery, (R at 859).
VI. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
A.

DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE WAS IMPROPER

Although

trial

courts have discretion with

regard

to the

control of their calendar, it is an abuse of discretion to deprive
a party

of

its

right

to

an adjudication

except

egregious circumstances. Although the trial court

in

the

followed

most
the

format for dismissal as set forth in the cases of this court, it
intentionally ignored significant facts which are undisputed on the
record

in reaching

its conclusion

to granting

dismissal. Both

parties have acted in a manner that delayed the proceedings and
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both parties have also moved the case along with a view to judicial
economy and a resolution of all questions before the court. The
trial court's dismissal for failure to prosecute unfairly punishes
plaintiffs in this matter and ignores defendant actions.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO DISMISS

The trial court

is an inferior court to the Utah

Supreme

Court. A Motion for Interlocutory Order was before the Supreme
Court, (R at 1745) when the order to dismiss was entered, (R at
1879). Because the district court

is an inferior

court to the

Supreme Court of Utah, it is without jurisdiction to divest the
Utah Supreme Court of jurisdiction over a question before it, and
is

obligated

to

wait

until

the

Utah

Supreme

Court

returns

jurisdiction before continuing to act.
C.

EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DAMAGES ARE PROPER.

For almost forty (40) years the law in Utah has recognized
damages for emotional

distress when

the conduct of a party

is

outrageous and he either intended to cause emotional distress, or
acted

with

reckless

disregard

of

the

facts. Defendant

Brian

violated the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children when
he brought Baby Johnson to Utah. He has provided no information of
mitigation of his actions. He also failed for over one (1) year to
achieve a consent

to terminate parental

rights from the birth

mother. It is a question of fact as to whether or not his conduct
was outrageous under the circumstances. There is no doubt that it
is well recognized generally in society that family bond between
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natural parents as well as adoptive parents is highly emotional in
nature and the disruption of that bond, or the threatening of that
relationship will result in an extremely high degree of emotional
distress on the part of the party so threatened. Defendant Brian
acted either with intent or reckless disregard of the facts when he
failed to comply with statutes which protect the rights of both
natrual parents and adoptive parents with regard to their legal
relationships to the child and each other. The court therefore
acted improperly in as much as a genuine issue of material
existed, and the Utah Supreme Court has recognized

fact

a cause of

action for this type of activity for over forty (40) years.
VI. ARGUMENT
A.

DISMISSAL WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
STANDARD OF REVIEW:
It is not to be doubted that in order to handle the
business of the court with efficiency and expedition, the
trial court should have a reasonable latitude of
discretion in dismissing for failure to prosecute if a
party fails to move forward according to the rules and
the direction of the court, without justifiable excuse.
Westinqhouse Electric Supply Company v. Paul W. Larsen
Construction, Inc., 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975).

Plaintiffs brought a motion for new trial following dismissal
with prejudice for failure to prosecute, (R at 1448). Rule 59 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in material part as
follows:
[A] new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties
on all or part of the issues, for any of the following
causes...(1) irregularity in the proceedings of the
court, jury or adverse party, or any order of the court
or abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial.
11

Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure grants the trial
court discretion to dismiss actions for failure to prosecute and
provides in material part as follows:
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For failure
of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these
rules or any order of the court, defendant may move for
dismissal of an action or of any claim against him.
In Westinqhouse Electric Supply

Company v. Paul W.

Larsen

Construction, Inc., 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975) the court held that:
It is not to be doubted that in order to handle the
business of the court with efficiency and expedition, the
trial courts should have a reasonable latitude of
discretion in dismissing for failure to prosecute if a
party fails to move forward according to the rules and
the direction of the court, without justifiable excuse.
Westinghouse Electric, 544 P.2d at 878-879.
Therefore, this court reviews with deference orders to dismiss
for failure to prosecute. However, when that discretion is abused,
no hesitation should be exercised in setting aside an improper
dismissal.
In

addition,

the

dismissal

must

be

reviewed

with

all

inferences in a light most to the plaintiff. Martin v. Stevens, 121
Utah 484, 243 P.2d 747 (1952).
B.

DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE VIOLATED THE OPEN
COURTS PROVISION
STANDARD FOR REVIEW:
A trial court's statements or conclusions of law
are accorded no particular deference; we review
them for correctness. Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d
1176,1179 (Utah 1989).
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This

Court

and

the Utah

Supreme

Court

has

had

numerous

opportunities to review dismissals with prejudice for failure to
prosecute. One reason that the discretion to dismiss is limited by
Section 11 of Article I (the Open Court's Provision) of the Utah
Constitution which provides as follows:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury
done to him in his person, property or reputation shall
have remedy by due course of law, which shall be
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending
before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel,
any civil cause to which he is a party.
Section 11 has been used to overturn limitations on actions;
(Berry Ex Rel . Berry v. Beach Aircraft Corporation, 717 P.2d 670
(Utah 1986); Sun Valley Waterbeds of Utah, Inc. v. Herm Hughes &
Son, 782 P.2d 188 (Utah 1989); Horton v. Gold Miner's Daughter, 785
P. 2d 1087 (Utah 1989)), prevent unnecessary bars to action such as
the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity. See (Stoker v. Stoker,
616 P.2d 590 (Utah 1980)), and prevent ambiguous waivers of rights
to appeal

to court. (Brackin v. Dahle, 68 Utah

486, 251

P.16

(1926)).
It is this constitutional right to adjudication of rights in
open court which has undoubtedly been behind the distaste that the
appellate courts have traditionally shown for motions for dismissal
for failure to prosecute. In Johnson v. Firebrand, Inc., 571 P.2d
1368 (Utah 1977), four (4) years was found to insufficient time for
a case to be before the court to support a motion for dismissal
with prejudice. The court also found that a sixteen month lapse,
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during which settlement negotiations were ongoing, was insufficient
to support dismissal in Utah Oil Company v. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135
(Utah 1977). Where

counsel

for plaintiff did not appear for a

hearing to set a trial, (but was ready willing and able to go
forward

therewith),

insufficient

a

six

in Polke v.

month

lack

of

Ivers, 561 P.2d

activity
1075

was

found

(Utah 1977) to

support dismissal. Finally, the court in Crystal Lime & Cement
Company v. Robbins, 8 Utah 2d 389, 335 P.2d 624 (1959), the court
held that where either party could have gone forward, but both
chose to dally, that it was an abuse of discretion to dismiss with
prejudice for failure to prosecute.
It is therefore only upon the most telling signs of failure to
prosecute, and an unequivocal showing of clean hands by the moving
party, that a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute should be
granted.
C.

THE FACTS DO NOT SUPPORT A WESTINGHOUSE DISMISSAL
STANDARD FOR REVIEW:
A trial court's statements or conclusions of law
are accorded no particular deference; we review
them for correctness. Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P. 2d
1176,1179 (Utah 1989).
If there is any genuine issue as to any material fact,
the motion should be denied. Young v. Filerenia, 121 Utah
646 244 P.2d 862 Cert, denied 344 U.S. 886 73 S.Ct. 186
97 L.Ed 685 (1952).

The court, in Westinghouse Electric Supply Company v. Paul W.
Larsen Constructions, Inc., 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975) identified
several factors to be considered by a court considering dismissal.
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In Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237 (Ut App. 1989), the court
formulated those factors as follows: (1) lapse of time; (2) conduct
of the parties;

(3) opportunity

to move the case forward;

(4)

actions of the parties to do so; (5) difficulty and prejudice of
the parties; and (6) injustice which may result from dismissal.
(1)

LAPSE OF TIME. This case was filed two and one-half years

prior to motion to dismiss (R at 12 and 1802). Discovery had been
completed except for defendant's deposition of Mrs. Johnson which
they failed to reschedule. In fact, they showed no interest therein
once Mr. Johnson's deposition had been completed, (R at 1898). The
request for her deposition track with those of her husband, and
none was scheduled following the completion of his deposition,

(R

at 192, 198, 230, 232, 889 and 943). At the time of dismissal, the
case was ready for trial, with the exception that the Utah Supreme
Court

had

not

entered

an

order

dismissing

the

Motion

of

Interlocutory Appeal, (R at 1902). The record does not show any
return of jurisdiction to the trial

court to set trial or act

following the request for interlocutory appeal, (R at 1645).,
Notwithstanding the lack of the return of jurisdiction to the
trial court to act in this matter, both counsel for plaintiffs and
defendants were under the impression that a trial date was to be
set by

the court

However,

the

for November

court

did

not

2, 1992, (R at 1737 and
set

trial

for

November

1745).

2,

1992

notwithstanding the understanding of the parties on that point, (R
at 1899). Regardless of the parties' understanding, however, the
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fact that trial had not been set cannot be used against plaintiffs
when both parties could have requested a trial setting from the
court. See Crystal Lime & Cement Company v. Robbins. In fact, this
factor, although determined to be of no importance by the trial
court ought to support the position of appellants. The case with
the closest resemblance to this is that of Maxfield v. Fishery, 538
P.2d

1323

(Utah

1975),

wherein

counsel

for

plaintiffs

did

absolutely nothing for two (2) years. Discovery was not responded
to,

bond

had

not

been

filed,

and

there

was

no

pretense

of

preparation for trial. This is significantly different from the
current case wherein discovery had been completed and the parties
are ready for trial, (R at 1906-1907).
(2)

CONDUCT OF THE PARTIES.

The court found with regard to

conduct of the parties that plaintiffs were delaying the matter by
replacement of counsel and refusal to prosecute the case whereas
defendants had consistently and continuously moved the case forward
by conducting discovery, narrowing of the scope of the case through
pretrial

motions

and

cooperating

with

opposing

counsel

and

adherence to court cut-off dates and deadlines, (R at 1865). In
making that finding, the trial court ignored the effect of the
actions of defendants and the effect of orders of the court in
preparing for trial. Defendant Brian was not deposed until November
30, 1991, (R at 1225), although he was initially deposed October
27, 1990, (R at 222). Defendant Brian refused to respond to Request
for Production of Documents on meretricious grounds, as well as to
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interrogatories, (see R at 530 and 555). The trial court had to
compel

defendant

Brian

to comply

with

discovery,

(R at 859).

Defendant Nielsen & Senior sought a protective order in this matter
to prevent plaintiffs from learning that a policy of malpractice
insurance in fact did exist contrary to their representations with
regard to the same, (R at 1700).
It is true that plaintiffs did request extensions of time to
respond to discovery and to get counsel, (R at 79, 96, 139, 273,
280, 300 and 307). The court ordered responses by plaintiffs and
compelled them to respond also. (R at 859 at 863). However, the
court's record demonstrates that plaintiff James A. Johnson made
himself available for deposition despite his medical

condition,

with the trial by combat lasting over a three (3) day period in
November

of

1990,

(R

at

1177).

This was

over

a

year

before

Defendant Brian willingly submitted to deposition, (R at 1177).
Following the April 16, 1991 appearance of Darwin Fisher in this
matter, (R at 867), no continuance of the deposition of James A.
Johnson was made at his request, (R at 98).
(3)

THE TRIAL COURT ITSELF CONTRIBUTED TO THE DELAY IN THIS
MATTER.

Trial was initially set for February 17-28, 1992, (R at 897).
The court on January 17, 1992 granted defendant Brian leave to file
a Counterclaim, (R at 1329). This Counterclaim was not filed until
two weeks before the scheduled trial date on February 4, 1992, (R
at 1484). The court granted permission to file a Counterclaim by
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defendant Brian even through sixteen months had elapsed since the
filing of the case and defendant Brian was well aware of all facts
necessary for a Counterclaim and did not rely upon the completion
of James Johnson's deposition which occurred November 22, 1991.
Counterclaim was filed October 17, 1991, (R at 929). Defendant
Brian has never explained his reasons for delaying sixteen months
before filing a Counterclaim for which he had all facts, and at
least no later than November 30, 1991 when the original three (3)
day deposition of Mr. Johnson was terminated due to depression, (R
at 1177).

It was due to the filing

counterclaim

by

the

court

that

the

and the acceptance of the
February

trial

date

was

continued until May of 1992, (R at 1490).
The court further modified the circumstances of this case by
granting

a

summary

judgment

denying

any

and

all

damages

for

emotional distress suffered as a result of the tortious acts of
defendants, (R at 1371). With the major element of damages in this
matter

dismissed

by

the court

in

its motion granting

partial

summary judgment, and because appeal would be taken in this matter
regardless of the result in court, a request for interlocutory
appeal

was

filed April

7, 1992, (R

at 1645).

The court

then

continued on its own motion the trial without date, (R at 1647).
The

purpose

for

the

request

for

interlocutory

order

was

specifically for judicial economy. Should the trial have occurred
without emotional distress as an element of damage, and regardless
of the outcome, an appeal would have been taken to this court to
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determine whether or not plaintiffs were entitled to

emotional

distress damages in the circumstances. If the right to present
evidence on emotional distress was found to be appropriate by this
court, a second complete trial would have had to have been held. It
made absolutely no sense to proceed further until an order was
entered by the Court of Appeals or the Utah Supreme Court either
granting the interlocutory appeal or denying the same. As of April
6, 1993, the date of the dismissal, no order with regard to the
interlocutory appeal had been entered. The only purpose for the
filing of the interlocutory appeal was to move this case forward
and for judicial economy. The continuance from February to May was
necessary because of defendant Brian's tardy counterclaim, which
left plaintiffs with no time to prepare

therefore.

Plaintiffs

actions were a direct result of rulings of the trial court based
upon actions of defendants, and should not be charged to plaintiffs
as improper.
Despite the foregoing, the trial court has ignored all of the
dilatory actions of defendants in this matter which are of record,
and concentrated on plaintiffs* actions. It has chosen to consider
in its findings of
prior

to the

filing

fact settlement negotiations which
of the action, as

well

prior

occurred

changes

of

counsel. The court has made unsupported findings that the change of
counsel acted to delay the prosecution of this case. Discovery
proceeded without any hinderance following the appearance Conder &
Wangsgard. Depositions were held in November of 1990, and the
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record shows that Conder & Wangsgard actively prosecuted this case
following its appearance in August of 1990, (R at 184, 187, 218,
222,

224, 226, 288, (Answer to Interrogatories on November 19,

1990) and 273).
The court set a hearing for April 16, 1991, (R at 861), at
which time Darwin Fisher appeared as new counsel, (R at 867). He
then appeared at Settlement Conference schedule originally for June
26, 1991, (R at 871, which was eventually held July 12, 1991, (R at
887). Appellants fail to detect any indication from the record
which shows that the case was not moved forward by their counsel.
The only counsel which required time to become familiar with the
case was current counsel, and that was due to the two (2) factors
discussed hereinabove that the motion for interlocutory appeal had
not been acted upon by the Utah Supreme Court and there was some
confusion as to when Notice of Appearance was actually received and
accepted by the trial court. In as much as Darwin Fisher continued
to be counsel of record until January 15, 1993, it seems strange
that two (2) weeks is considered sufficient time in a case of this
magnitude to become fully conversant, see (R at 1785).
Defendants have sought to delay and prevent plaintiffs from
gaining information. They have required orders to compel responses
to discovery and deny their protective orders, (R at 859 and 1700).
Their experts have continuously not been available and required
plaintiffs to extend time in order to depose them, (R at 1647, 1657
and 1666). The court, for good cause, granted the extension to
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depose this witness, and did not find that it was plaintiffs' lack
of alacrity which was the reason therefore, (R at 1687). In as much
as Mr. Johnson made himself available as much as possible in spite
his condition for grueling trial by combat imposed upon him by
defendants at the deposition held November

28-30, 1990, (R at

1177), Defendant Brian did not seem to be available at any time
until after the completion of Mr. Johnson's deposition (R at 1225
and 1898), and the fact that both sides were attempting to deny
information to the other, the court's findings that the conduct of
the plaintiffs is entirely at fault for the delay herein is not
supported. At best, the facts show that both parties acted in the
same manner. Neither parties should therefore be punished.
(4)

ACTIONS OF THE PARTIES TO MOVE THE CASE FORWARD

Although the court held that the defendants had narrowed the
issues and sought to move the case forward in spite of plaintiffs
dilatory tactics, the facts cited hereinabove simply do not support
that. Appellants have combed the record for any indication that
defendants have been golden haired children in this matter. Both
parties have conducted discovery, and both parties have
protection

of

the

court

with

regard

to

certain

sought

matters.

A

reiteration of the facts as cited above should be unnecessary. The
record does not support the findings of the trial court and this
finding should therefore be set aside.
(5)

DIFFICULTY AND PREJUDICE OF THE PARTIES

Contrary to the court's finding that defendants only narrowed
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the scope of trial, the counterclaim filed by Defendant Brian in
fact

significantly

expanded

the

scope

of

trial

and

required

additional preparation and time by plaintiffs, R at 1329, 1474 and
1490.

The

prejudice

caused

by

the

counterclaim

cannot

be

underplayed. What is apparent is that the trial court is punishing
plaintiffs for the trial courts own failure to set trial November
2, 1992. It was the understanding of both parties that in fact such
trial was to occur at that time, and when such trial was not set,
counsel for plaintiffs at that time felt free to withdraw in as
much as there would be no prejudice to any party. The court itself
found that no prejudice was suffered thereby, (R at 1785). How the
court could have decided between January 15, 1993 and February 4,
1993 that prejudice had suddenly happened due to change of counsel
is beyond the comprehension of this counsel.
(6)

INJUSTICE WHICH MAY RESULT FROM DISMISSAL

The court found that no injustice will result from dismissal,
determining that no damages could have resulted which would be
significant. The trial court was unfamiliar with current litigation
costs which can rapidly accrue fees of astronomical

proportions

literally overnight. This was an element of damages. The court's
finding was contrary to the evidence presented before it in the
original Complaint, (R at 1-12) which in fact alleged
damages. If this court determines that emotional

significant

distress is a

valid damage for recovery in this type or action, there is no doubt
that the emotional distress damages dues to Post-traumatic Stress
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Disorder suffered by Plaintiffs will be of an extremely significant
nature, (R at
significantly

1177J.

Mr.

Johnson

lost

his

business

and

impaired emotionally as a direct result of

was
these

acts. This is a significant question of fact as to the exact amount
of that damage, and an out of hand dismissal that such damages
cannot be great is a direct violation of Section 11, Article I of
the Utah Constitution.
(7)

WESTINGHOUSE WAS NOT SATISFIED BY THE DISMISSAL IN THIS
ACTION

Contrary to the findings of the trial court, the record as a
whole demonstrates that plaintiffs were at least as culpable as
plaintiffs for the time lost prior to the filing of their motion
for dismissal with prejudice for failure to prosecute in February
of 1993. Neither side has acted as angels in this matter, but the
time which has elapsed is so small, and the confusion which was
caused both by the actions of defendants, the trial court, and the
Utah Supreme Court (by failing to file an order denying motion for
interlocutory appeal) significantly outweigh any prejudice caused
by plaintiffs

failure

to request

trial

setting. Dismissal

was

therefore an abuse of discretion.
D.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO DISMISS THIS
ACTION

Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Interlocutory Order regarding
the emotional distress damage question on April 7, 1992, (R at
1645). The Utah Supreme Court did not act on the interlocutory
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request prior to the motion to dismiss, April 6, 1993 (R at 1798).
A substantial question of jurisdiction exists in this case in as
much as grant of the interlocutory order would cause all of the
time periods which apply to appeals from final orders to apply to
this action. Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 5(e) states "if the
petition

is granted, the appeal

docketed

by the

granting

of the

shall

be deemed

to have been

petition, and all

proceeding

subsequent to the granting of the petition shall be as, and within
the time required, for appeals from final judgments". In as much as
the court had not entered an order in this matter either granting
the interlocutory request or denying the same, the

question was

before the Utah Supreme Court, and the case was subject to action
thereby.
The Supreme Court is a superior court to the district court.
Utah

Constitution

Article

VIII

Sections

2

and

3.

It

has

jurisdiction over cases before it. The reason this divested in the
trial court

of authority to act

is that if the Supreme Court

granted the interlocutory request following the dismissal it would
proffering an advisory opinion, and the trial court having the
jurisdiction to dismiss the case would have the effect of giving
the district court the power to control

the docket of the Utah

Supreme Court, and divest it of jurisdiction to review an order
which was properly before it. In as much as the Utah Supreme Court
had entered no order on the request for interlocutory order, the
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district

court

could not have had

jurisdiction, and

therefore

dismissal was void.
E.

DAMAGES FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ARE PROPER IN THIS MATTER

It is a question of fact what has caused the Post-traumatic
Stress Disorder suffered by plaintiffs. An expert has diagnosed it
as attributable to the adoption malpractice, (R at 1177). The trial
court, however, as a matter of law determined that such damages are
not

assessable

to

defendants

in

Utah,

(R

at

1371).

This

is

expressly contrary to the Utah Supreme Court findings in Samms v.
Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 358 P. 2d 344 (1961). In that case, the defendant
phoned and visited plaintiff on numerous occasions seeking intimate
relations with her. Plaintiff alleged that this caused her deep
emotional distress. The Utah Supreme Court agreed finding that:
[T]he best considered view recognizes an action for
severe emotional distress, though not accompanied by
bodily impact or physical injury, where the defendant
intentionally engaged in some conduct where plaintiff,
(a) with the purpose of inflicting emotional distress, or
(b) where any reasonable person would have known that
such would result; and his actions are of such a nature
to be considered outrageous and intolerable and that they
offend against the generally accepted standards of
decency and morality. Samms, 358 P.2d at 346-347
Without bodily injury Mr. and Mrs. Johnson have suffered acute
Post-Traumatic

Stress Disorder, (R at 1177).

In the opinion of

their treating physician, this was directly attributable to the
adoption. In the mess created by Defendant Brian, now a sitting
judge

with

a

reputation

for

strict

application

of

the

law,

defendant Brian did not comply with even one requirement of the
Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children. Although he was
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an experience adoption attorney, he simply went to Texas, picked
the baby up from the mother after she had left the hospital, took
the baby on the plane to Salt Lake City, and then handed the baby
to plaintiffs, (R at 1-12). There is a significant disagreement as
to what he told them at the airport, but it would seem even to a
lay person that an attorney should comply with statutes of which he
is aware, especially when we are dealing with rights as important
as those of parents and the adoption process. It is a question of
fact as to what Defendant Brian should have done in Texas and what
was possible to have been done in Texas prior to his returning with
the child. It is for this purpose that experts exist. It is not the
purpose of plaintiffs to argue that they are entitled to summary
judgment before this court with regard to the outrageous actions of
Defendant Brian, but if he did as alleged, and he has presented no
evidence in the record, in deposition, through interrogatories, or
through request for production of documents, which indicates that
he did anything to comply with the statutes, this would seem to be
a very good example of "outrageous and intolerable conduct" which
,f

offend[s] against the generally accepted standards of decency and

morality".
Plaintiffs

have

alleged

an

extremely

grievous

breach

of

professional ethics by defendant Brian. If in fact he failed to
turn in a professional performance in this matter, then at the very
least he is in breach of conduct and has committed malpractice.
Because of the universally recognized existence and character of
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the family bond, and the

love which both adoptive and

natural

parents hold for their children, it is beyond the comprehension of
plaintiffs that he would not know that malpractice in this case
would

be outrageous.

If

he simply

did

not

care, it would

be

reckless indifference to the effect of his actions, or imputable
intent. On this point, expert testimony is appropriate and the
summary judgment on this matter should be set aside in as much as
a genuine issue of material fact exists.
A genuine issue of material

fact exists in this matter and

summary judgment was therefore improper. With regard to the trial
court's conclusion of law, no particular deference may be granted
to it and as such should be reviewed for correctness. Doelle v.
Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Utah 1989). The trial court's grant
of summary

judgment denying a right

of recovery

for

emotional

distress damages in this matter is clearly contrary to Samms v.
Eccles, the trial court's conclusion of law deserves no particular
deference, and as such must be set aside. Plaintiffs are entitled
to recovery for emotional distress damages suffered in this matter.
VII. CONCLUSION
The trial court acted in haste when it dismissed for failure
to prosecute, and its findings are not based upon the record as a
whole.

Its findings

of

fact and

judgment

of dismissal

should

therefore be set aside.
In

addition

to

the

above,

the

trial

court

was

without

jurisdiction to dismiss in as much as the Utah Supreme Court had
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jurisdiction

this case

at the time

of dismissal. Judgment

of

dismissal was therefore moot and without effect.
Finally, partial summary judgment on the issue of emotional
distress was improper in as much as a genuine issue of material
fact exists regarding the outrageous conduct of Defendant Brian and
the intent in this matter. Dismissal of emotional distress damages
was therefore contrary to Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
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